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This paper studies how differences in the size of barriers to capital accumulation can account 
for differences in long run economic development paths.  In this model barriers affect both 
the beginning date and the pace of the modern economic growth.  A fundamental property of 
the model is that cross-country income differences matches the inverted U-shape pattern over 
time as observed in the data, hence implies a substantial fraction of existing income 
differences is really a transitional phenomenon.  Relative to papers that model this as steady 
state phenomenon, my model requires a smaller size of barriers to account for current 
disparities.  Another important finding is that this transitional effect increases significantly 
when I include the fact that today's low-income countries have had higher population growth 
rates during their early development stage than did the currently rich countries.    In a 
quantitative exercise I find that given the beginning dates of modern growth, the model 
accounts for a significant portion of current income differences. 
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The Centre for Economic Performance is financed by the Economic and Social Research Council 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Why do some countries produce so much more output per worker than others? This paper addresses
this question by focusing on the properties of long-run development paths found in economic data.
Long run economic data demonstrate three important development facts. First, all countries that
have experienced a sustained increase in per capita output also experienced a long period of stagna-
tion before it. Second, countries entered modern growth at diﬀerent points in time, referred to by
Reynolds(1985) as its turning point. Third, income diﬀerences between early and later developers
exhibit an inverted U-shape pattern over time, a feature of the data emphasized by Lucas (1998,
2000) and Pritchett (1997).
Models of international income diﬀerences usually compare steady states, ignoring these im-
portant development facts.1 A parallel literature studies development paths but with no reference
to international income diﬀerences either during the transition or in steady state.2 In this paper,
I bring elements from both literatures and study the international income diﬀerences implied by
diﬀerences in development paths. I do this by extending the Hansen and Prescott (1999) model.
In their model, there are two technologies with exogenous technological improvement. The ﬁrst
technology is the Malthusian technology which uses land, labor and capital. The second technol-
ogy is the Solow technology which uses labor and capital only. They show that when the level of
total factor productivity in the Solow technology is suﬃciently low, only the Malthus technology
is operated and there exists a balanced growth path in which stagnation results. As the level of
total factor productivity in the Solow technology increases, it becomes proﬁt a b l et ou s et h eS o l o w
technology and the turning point is being reached. The economy will then asymptotically converge
1This literature generally focuses on policies that distort capital accumulation (Mankiw, Romer and Weil(1992),
Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (1996), Parente, Rogerson and Wright (2000)), technology adoption (Parente and
Prescott(1994)), and level of total factor productivity (Hall and Jones(1999), Prescott(1998) , and Parente and
Prescott(1999)). See McGrattan and Schmit(1998) for a survey of papers on cross country income diﬀerences.
2An exception is the work of Lucas (2000) which uses the model by Tamura (1996) to study the evolution of the
relative income distribution by assigning turning points exogenously, and ﬁnds that income inequality exhibits an
inverted U-shape. I study the same issue but with the turning point endogenously determined. Models on transition
from stagnation to modern growth includes Becker, Murphy and Tamura (1990), Goodfriend and McDermott (1995),
Galor and Weil (1998), Jones (1999) and Hansen and Prescott (1999). These models diﬀer in several aspects regarding
the driving forces of the transition to modern growth and whether such transition is inevitable or not.
2to a Solow balanced growth path, in which the Malthus technology is not used at all. The turning
point is determined endogenously and depends on initial conditions - capital stock and population,
and the two technologies - input shares and total factor productivity levels and growth rates.
I extend the Hansen-Prescott model by introducing policies which act as barriers to discourage
capital accumulation in the Solow technology. Barriers in my model lower the level of income along
the balanced growth path and, more importantly, delay the turning point. Because of this second
eﬀect, cross-country income diﬀerences exhibit an inverted U-shape pattern over time, and hence my
model accounts for the third development fact. A key implication of my model is that a substantial
fraction of existing income diﬀerences is transitional. I show that relative to papers that model this
as a steady-state phenomenon, my model requires a smaller barrier to account for current income
disparities. Another important ﬁnding is that the transitional eﬀect increases signiﬁcantly when
I include the fact that today’s low-income countries have higher population growth rates during
their early development stage than did the currently rich countries when they were growing.
I consider two empirical case studies to illustrate the strength of this model as a development
model. These case studies are the development experiences of Africa and Japan. In both cases, I
am interested in their experiences relative to the UK which is the ﬁrst country to experience an
industrial revolution. I use the actual diﬀerence in turning points to determine their relative sizes
of barriers. In the case of Africa and the UK, I ﬁnd that barriers that account for the diﬀerence in
turning points can account for more than 70 percent of their current income diﬀerences. Moreover,
my model predicts relative income in Africa will continue to worsen until the year 2045 even if its
relative size of barriers remains unchanged. In the case of Japan, I show that its postwar miracle
experience is a result of a reduction in barriers. Moreover, I ﬁnd that its slowdown during the 70s
is not necessarily a result of an increase in its relative size of barriers as argued by Parente and
Prescott (1994).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 documents the three long run
development facts as a motivation for this paper. Section 3 presents the model. The model’s
implication for international income diﬀerences are studied in section 4. Section 5 discusses the
3role of the population proﬁle in the model. The two cases studies are considered in section 6. A
conclusion is given in section 7.
2 Motivation
This section documents three important long run development facts in the data. (1) All countries
experienced a long period of stagnation before experiencing modern economic growth (sustained
increase in per capita GDP). (2) Countries enter into modern growth at diﬀerent points in time. (3)
The income diﬀerence between the early developers and the later developers exhibits an inverted U-
shape pattern. The data used in this paper are reported in Lucas (1998). Figure (1) demonstrates
that per capita income for all ﬁve diﬀerent regions in the world had been stagnant before the 19th
century and started to grow at diﬀerent times for diﬀerent regions.3 This stagnation is not because
the world experienced no growth in total output but, rather because the increase in population
oﬀset the increases in output. The Malthusian theory therefore matches the experiences of the
world fairly well prior to 1750. However, countries subsequently started to leave this type of
stagnation and enter the modern growth regime. For instance, as suggested by Reynolds (1985)
and shown in Figure (2), the turning point (the time at which modern growth begins) for the UK
is around 1800 while the turning points for Japan and Africa are around 1900 and for China and
the Indian Subcontinent around 1950.4 As a result, income disparities across groups increase after
1800. For the same group of countries, Figure (3) plots the GDP per capita ratio between the UK
and the rest of the countries. For most countries, the path of relative GDP resembles an inverted
U-shape pattern over time.
The message from the data is clear: in order to understand current income diﬀerences, we
should not overlook the fact that countries have diﬀerent turning points. To proceed, I study a
3Region I includes UK, US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Japan and Western Europe are region II and
III respectively. Region IV includes Latin America, Eastern Europe and Soviet Union. Finally, region V includes
Africa and Asia(except Japan).
4Africa includes all of Africa except Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and Egypt. Indian Subcontinent includes
Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal and Bhutan. According to Reynolds, modern growth began in Africa
in late nineteen century due to colonization.
4version of Hansen and Prescott (1999) model. The Hansen-Prescott model has the advantage that
it determines the turning point endogenously and behaves asymptotically like the standard Solow
model. In their model, the reason for diﬀerent turning points across countries is that there are
diﬀerences in the unit eﬃciency of land per worker and diﬀerences in the level of technologies.
However, such diﬀerences cannot be big enough to explain the observed large diﬀerences in turning
points. Such diﬀerences also cause disparities in income prior to the turning points and the data
show that the income diﬀerences between the richest and the poorest countries pre-1800 were
small. I argue that diﬀerent institutions for investment incentives can reconcile both small income
diﬀerences prior to turning points and large diﬀerences in turning points, and as a result large
current income diﬀerences. The intuition is straightforward, because capital has a small role to
play prior to modern growth, diﬀerences in investment incentives do not have an important role
to play in the determination of income disparities along the Malthusian path. But they can delay
the adoption of the capital-intensive Solow technology and so explain large disparities in income
post-development as a result of the diﬀerences in the turning points.
3 The Model
I use barriers to capital accumulation as an explanation for why countries are poor and, in the
context of this paper, why modern growth begins later in some countries. Barriers can take the
form of taxes on investment goods, corruption or other institutional factors that increase the relative
price of investment goods, which in turn discourages capital accumulation. In this paper, I follow
Parente and Prescott and model barriers by assuming that they reduce the eﬃciency of transforming
forgone consumption goods into usable capital goods.
3.1 The Economy
Technology Output in this economy can be produced using either one of two technologies, the
Malthus and the Solow technologies. The Malthus technology features constant return to scale
in capital, labor and land. In contrast, the Solow technology features constant return to scale in
5capital and labor only. Both technologies are subject to exogenous technological change. The two













where Kit, Nit and Lit denote capital, labor and land used in technology i at time t =0 ,1......,
φ ∈ (0,1) is the capital share, µ ∈ (0,1) is the labor share and 1−µ−φ ∈ (0,1) is the land share for
the Malthus technology, θ ∈ (0,1) is the capital share for the Solow technology, γm > 1 and γs > 1
are the growth rates while Am and As are the initial level of total factor productivity (TFP) for
the Malthus and Solow technologies. I will interpret the Malthus sector as the agricultural sector
and the Solow sector as the industrial sector.
Physical capital is assumed to depreciate completely each period.5 Land is a ﬁxed factor.
Output of the two sectors are identical, and can be used either for consumption or investment.
Hence, feasibility requires:
Ct + Xmt + Xst = Ymt + Yst (3)
where Ct is aggregate consumption, while Xmt and Xst are the aggregate investments in the Malthus
and Solow capital stock in period t.
Firms in each sector are assumed to behave competitively and rent all factors of production
from households. A representative ﬁrm in sector j takes the wage rate and rental rates for capital
and land as given, and chooses labor, capital and land input to maximize proﬁts.
Max
Njt,Kjt,Ljt
Yjt − wtNjt − rKjtKjt − rLtLjt j = m,s
s.t.(1) and (2)
Household Sector The population structure is that of a two period overlapping generations
model. In the beginning of each period, the current old agents give birth to young agents. Following
5In the quantitative work carried out later a period will be interpreted to be 35 years, so this assumption is
empirically reasonable.
6Hansen and Prescott, the number of children an old agent has depends on his living standard when
young. Letting Nt be the number of young agents in period t,a n dc1t be the consumption level for
young agents in period t, the population dynamics are given by:
Nt+1 = g(c1t)Nt
where g(.) is an exogenous function that will be speciﬁed in more detail when the model is calibrated.
In period 0,t h e r ea r eN−1 old agents and N0 young agents. Each initial old agent is endowed
with K0
N−1 units of capital and L
N−1 units of land. Young agents are endowed with one unit of time,
which they supply inelastically. Old agents are assumed to be unable to work. Young agents make
a consumption-saving decision by deciding how much land and capital to purchase. An old agent
receives income from renting land and capital to ﬁrms and by selling land to the next generation.6
The size of barriers, π, is modelled as a policy parameter that discourages young agents from
investing in Solow capital. More speciﬁcally, for every unit of consumption good that a young
agent gives up, he can get 1
π units of Solow capital. In equilibrium, π will be the relative price of
Solow capital goods to consumption goods. In my international income comparison that follows, π
is allowed to vary across countries.7
For each generation t, young agents maximize the following lifetime utility, by choosing con-
sumption (c1t,c 2t+1) and investment portfolio (xmt,x st,l t+1):
U (c1t,c 2t)=u(c1t)+βu(c2t+1)
subject to the budget constraints
c1t + xmt + xst + qtlt+1 = wt (4)
c2t+1 = rkmt+1xmt + rkst+1
xst
π
+( qt+1 + rLt+1)lt+1 (5)
6More generally, if capital did not depreciate completely, the old agent would also sell capital to next generation.
7Note that putting barriers in the Malthus sector does not change the main results of the paper as will be shown
later.
7where β is the discount factor and qt is the price of land in period t. Assuming log utility, u(c)=l nc,













if xst > 0
= rkmt+1 if xmt > 0
3.2 Competitive Equilibrium
Given π, N0,K 0 and L, the total land of the economy, a competitive equilibrium for this economy
consists of sequences for t ≥ 0 of prices {qt,w t,r Kmt,r Kst,r Lt}; ﬁrm allocations, {Kmt, Kst,N mt,
Nst,L mt,Y mt,Y st}; and household allocations, {c1t,c 2t+1,x mt,x st,l t+1}, such that:
1. Given the sequence of prices, household allocations solve the utility maximization problem.
2. Given the sequence of prices, ﬁrm allocations solve the ﬁrm’s proﬁt maximization problem
3. All markets clear:
Ymt + Yst = Ntc1t + Nt−1c2t + Ntxt
Nmt + Nst = Nt
Kmt + Kst = Kt
Lmt = L = Nt−1lt
where Nt and Kt denotes the aggregate labor and capital in this economy.






83.3 Dynamics of the Model
The ﬁrst question I address is under what circumstances are the two technologies operated. Because
land is always supplied inelastically, in equilibrium it is always proﬁtable to operate the Malthus
technology8. This, however, is not necessarily true for the Solow technology. However, I will show
that for suﬃciently high TFP in the Solow technology, it will also be operated. When the Solow
technology is not operated, I call this the Malthus-only economy. When the Solow technology is
used, I say that the economy is in transition to modern economic growth.
I now proceed as follows. First, I characterize the Malthus-only economy. Second, I ﬁnd the
condition for the Solow technology to be operated. Third, I describe the asymptotic behavior of
the economy.
3.3.1 Malthus-only Economy





wt = µymt (9)




where ymt and kmt are the output and capital per worker in Malthus-only economy.
One can look for a balanced growth path in the Malthus-only economy. To do this, I need to put
some restrictions on the population growth function g(.). As the model is motivated to reproduce
the fact that output per worker is stagnant before the industrial revolution, g(c1t) is chosen such
that the population growth rate is the same as the growth rate of output along the balanced growth
path in the Malthus-only economy. Following Hansen-Prescott, I now show that the population
growth function g(.) can be chosen to ensure this. Letting ˆ ym and ˆ km be the stagnant levels of
8Suppose rLt,r kmt,r Kst and wt are equilibrium prices such that the Malthus technology is not operated. Then
since land can only be used in the Malthus technology, there is an excess supply of land, which implies that these
prices cannot be an equilibrium.
9output and capital per worker respectively, the Malthus production function implies:










g(c1) >g (c1m) ∀c1 ∈ [c1m,c 1m +  ] where   > 0
which I henceforth assume.
Under this restriction, equations (1), (8), (9) and (10) together with the market clearing condi-
tions imply that, along a Malthus-only balanced growth path, aggregate output, capital, the price
of land and the rental rate of land all grow at the same rate as does population. The wage rate, the
rental rate of capital, output per capita, capital per capita, capital-output ratio and consumption
of the young and old are all constant.
3.3.2 Transition
Given N0, Ic a nc h o o s eK0 such that the economy begins on the Malthus-only balanced growth
path in period 0.9 I can then determine when the Solow technology will be used.
Proposition 1 Assume the economy is on the Malthus-only balanced growth path in period 0. The
Solow technology is used when
t>
ln Am















9One can solve for the constant capital-output ratio along the the Malthus-only balanced growth path using the
market clearing condition
Kt+1 = Nt (wt − c1t) − qtL
10Proof. First note that if the Solow technology were to be used, proﬁt maximization implies






The proﬁt function for a ﬁrm in the Solow sector in period t is:





st − rkstKst − wtNst
which is equivalent to:












If both technologies were used, we must have rkst
π = rkmt, which implies











Let ˆ rm and ˆ wm be the constant rental rate of capital and wage along the Malthus balanced growth









By assumption, the economy is on the Malthus-only balanced growth path in period 0,
Asγt
s >π θAmB0
It follows that the Solow technology is ﬁr s tu s e di np e r i o dt∗
π,w h e r et∗




As +l nB0 + θlnπ
lnγs
Once the Solow technology is used, output per worker starts to grow. This is precisely the
turning point when modern growth begins, or the process of Industrial Revolution starts. In what
follows I will refer to t∗
π as the turning point. Note that the Solow technology is used independently
o ft h er e l a t i v es i z eo fγm and γs. Since the right hand side of the equation (11) is just a constant,
11the Solow technology will be used at some point as long as γs > 1. Therefore, the model predicts
that modern growth is inevitable in all countries, but that it’s starting point depends on the level
of barriers, the relative level of total factor productivity of the two technologies, input shares, and
the initial quality of land, labor force and capital. Note that the population growth function will
not aﬀect the turning point as it only takes eﬀect after consumption exceeds the level along the
Malthus balanced growth path, at which point the economy has already passed its turning point.






















Note that, as implied by (12) and (13), when both technologies are operated, marginal products
are equal across technologies. This, together with the market clearing conditions, determines the
labor and capital allocated to each sector.
Lemma 2 Assume θ ≥ φ, γs ≥ γm , and one of the following is true: (i)( 1 − θ) ≥ µ and
g (c1t) > 1, or (ii)( 1− θ) >µand exist ¯ t and suﬃciently small n ≥ 1 such that g(c1t) ≤ n ∀ t>¯ t.
Then, the equilibrium Nmt
Nt is converging to zero.
Proof. See Appendix 1.
This lemma simply says that if capital is more productive in the faster-growing Solow technology,
and if one of the following is true: (i) the labor share is higher in the Solow sector and labor supply
is growing, or (ii) labor share is higher in the Malthus sector and the growth in labor supply is
small enough after a certain date. Then, the Malthus sector will eventually disappear.
3.3.3 Solow-only Economy
Assume now that the Solow technology has a higher growth rate of TFP. As already noted, this
condition is not necessary for the Solow technology to be used. Assuming also that the population
12growth rate eventually decreases and converges to a constant, the previous lemma implies labor and
capital allocated to the Malthus sector will converge to zero. Equation (14) then implies that the
rental rate of land relative to the price of output will also converge to zero.10 Hence, asymptotically,
the economy behaves the same as a standard Solow growth economy and will converge to a balanced





wt =( 1− θ)ˆ yπst (16)
where ˆ yπst and ˆ kπst are the output and capital per worker along the asymptotic Solow balanced
growth path for an economy with size of barriers equal to π.
Along the asymptotic balanced growth path, output and capital per worker grow at the same
constant rate. The Solow technology production function implies:
ˆ yπst = Asγt
sˆ kθ
πst
Thus, both output and capital per worker grow at the rate (γ
1/(1−θ)
s −1) along the asymptotic bal-
anced growth path. Equations(2),(10),(15) and (16), together with the market clearing conditions
then imply that output per worker, capital per worker, consumption per young and old, and the
wage rate all grow at (γ
1/(1−θ)
s − 1).
The dynamics of the model, therefore, capture the experiences of rich countries. The economy
starts oﬀ with stagnant output per worker. Modern growth then begins with an increase in labor
being allocated to the industrial sector. Finally, the economy converges to a Solow balanced growth
path.
4I n t e r n a t i o n a l I n c o m e D i ﬀerences
This section studies the potential of the model to account for international income diﬀerences. For
this purpose, I consider two economies that are identical except for the level of their barriers.
10A test for this result should be compared to the value of farmland in the data, as land in this model is only used
for the Malthus sector. Hansen and Prescott (1999) document that value of farmland relative to the value of GNP
has declined from 88% in 1870 to 9 % in 1990.
134.1 Analytical Results
Proposition 3 Assume γs ≥ γm and g(.) → g. Consider two economies that diﬀer only in their
levels of barriers. Let ˆ yπist denote the output per worker along the asymptotic Solow-only balanced









The proof consists essentially of showing that the ratio of these two economies’ capital-output
ratios is equal to π2
π1(See appendix 2). This model thus generates the same long run income diﬀer-
ences as the standard one sector barrier model.11
The interesting point of this model, however, is its implications for diﬀerent turning points as
ar e s u l to fd i ﬀerent levels of barriers. Proposition 1 implies two main analytical results.
Lemma 4 An Industrial Revolution is inevitable in both economies which means there is no ab-
solute poverty trap.
Lemma 5 The relationship between the turning points t∗
π1 and t∗











11By the standard barrier model, we mean the following:





where 0 <β<1 and ct is agent’s consumption in period t.







where γ is the total factor productivity growth, Kt, and Nt are capital and labor inputs at period t.
The law of motion for capital is:
Kt+1 =( 1− δ)Kt +
Xt
π
where δ is depreciation rate for capital, and Xt is aggregate investment at period t. Feasibility requires:
Ct + Xt = Yt
where Ct is aggregate consumption at period t.
14Thus, the turning point for the economy with a larger π occurs θ lnπ
lnγs periods later. Note that
a higher capital share for the Solow technology not only increases the income diﬀerence along the
Solow balanced growth path, but also increases the diﬀerence in turning points between economies.
The intuition is as follow. The turning point is reached when the Solow technology is used which
implies investment in Solow capital is positive. On the other hand, the eﬀect of barriers is to reduce
investment in Solow capital. As θ increases, the role of capital in the Solow technology becomes
more important. Thus, given the TFP growth rate for the Solow technology, a given size of barriers
causes longer delay in turning point when θ is increased.12
4.2 Quantitative Results
4.2.1 Calibration and Computation
The economy with π equal to one is calibrated to match the development experience of England
before 1800 and the postwar development experience of the industrialized countries. The year 1800
is taken as the time at which modern growth began for the English economy, and will map to my
endogenously determined variable t∗
1. A period in this economy is interpreted to be 35 years in
real time, which as noted earlier, justiﬁes the assumption that capital fully depreciates after one
period. Agents in this economy will therefore live for 70 years working for the ﬁrst 35 years of
their life-span. The postwar period will therefore be interpreted as t∗
1 +5in my model. The initial
conditions, Am,A s,Land N0 are set to be one arbitrarily. Given N0, K0 is chosen such that the
economy is initially on the Malthus-only economy.13 As the calibration strategy is the same as
Hansen and Prescott (1999), I will only brieﬂyr e v i e wt h e i rs t e p s .T h ep o p u l a t i o ng r o w t hr a t ef o r
the pre-1800 period in the UK is used to calibrate the productivity growth rate of the Malthus
technology, and the relationship between the population growth rate and the GDP per capita for
12Since capital has a very small role in Malthus sector, putting barriers there does not change the main results. In
general, if barriers aﬀect both sectors, the income diﬀerences along Malthus-only balanced growth path is π
φ/(1−φ),
along the Solow-only balanced growth path is π




ln γs where by
assuumption θ>φ .

















15the industrial economies is used to calibrate the population growth function g (.). A general pattern
in the long run population data presented in Lucas (1998) can be summarized by the g(c1) function
in Figure (4), which is also similar to Figure II in Kremer (1993). It says population growth rate
ﬁrst increases until the living standard is x1 times its Malthusian level and the decreases to a
constant level when the living standard is x2 times its Malthusian level. The population growth
function is then calibrated to this shape with x1 =2 ,x 2 =1 8and m =2where m =2corresponds
to a 2% average annual population growth rate. Finally, the postwar economic development of the
industrial economies is used to calibrate the productivity growth rate of the Solow technology and
the discount factor. To summarize, the parameters values are:
θ µ φ γm γs β
0.4 0.6 0.1 1.03 1.52 1
The main issue in solving for the equilibrium in this model is to ﬁnd the equilibrium price of
land. Given L,N0 and K0, the equilibrium price for land is solved using the shooting algorithm
described in Hansen and Prescott (1999).
4.2.2 Results
With the same calibrated parameters, I then compute the equilibrium path of another economy
with a π equal to 4 as a benchmark case. Jones (1994) studies the Summer and Hetson data set
and ﬁnds that the maximum relative machinery price to that of the US for the period 1960-85 is
equal to 4. More recently, using the same data set, Restuccia and Urrutia (2001) construct a panel
for the relative price of aggregate investment to consumption over the period 1960-85. They found
that the relative price diﬀerences across countries are large. In particular, the ratio between the
average of the top and bottom ﬁve percent of the distribution of relative prices is 11.3 in 1960 and
6.5 in 1985. Therefore, I will also report the results of using higher values of π later in this section.
Figures (5) - (9) summarize the quantitative results for the case in which π equals 4. Figures
(5) and (6) show that while the UK starts to allocate labor and capital inputs to the Solow sector
in 1800, the Solow technology is still inactive in the distorted economy until 1870. The fraction
of labor and capital allocated to Malthus sector decrease because of the diminishing returns in
16Malthus technology associated with the ﬁxed supply of land. The ﬁrst and the second development
facts are replicated in Figure (7). It shows that output per worker starts to grow in 1800 for the
UK and in 1870 for the distorted economy. The model predicts that in 1975, output per worker
for the UK is 18 times higher than its level in 1765 while it’s only 7 times higher for the distorted
economy.
The third development fact is also captured by the model in Figure (8). The model predicts
that relative output per worker will increase from 1 to a maximum of 3.2 before declining to 2.5
once both economies have reached their Solow-only balanced growth path. This pattern of relative
income diﬀerences generated by the model closely resembles the data in Figure (3). Moreover, a
bigger income diﬀerence is obtained (a 26 percent increase) relative to the balanced growth path
level.
As show in Figure (9), the growth rate is not monotonic as in the standard Solow growth
model as an economy converges to the balanced growth path. In particular, it ﬁrst increases and
then decreases to its balanced growth path rate. The increasing growth is a feature of the data
emphasized by Romer (1986).14 It is interesting to note that this model can produce such an
outcome with two constant return to scale technologies.
T h eg r o w t hr a t ed y n a m i c sa n dt h ei n v e r t e dU - s h a p ei n c o m ed i ﬀerences are intimately tied. In
the standard Solow model, growth rates fall monotonically since the capital-output ratio increases
monotonically along the transition. However, the capital-output ratio in this two-sector model ﬁrst
decreases then increases. Two elements are important for this result: (1) perfect mobility of capital
























and (2)positive growth in labor supply at the initial phase of transition.
Intuitively, as total labor supply is growing during the early phase of the transition, labor
14Romer (1986) tests the trend of the growth rate using raw data from Maddison (1979) for countries with data
no later than 1870. These countries include: United Kingdom, France, Denmark, United States, Germany, Sweden,
Italy, Australia, Norway, Japan and Canada. He rejects the null hypothesis that there is a nonpositive trend in the
growth rate for 8 out of the 11 countries at the 10 percent level.
17allocated to Malthus sector is not decreasing at a signiﬁcant rate even though the fraction allocated
to the Malthus sector may be. Since the Solow sector is growing at a faster rate, the capital-output
ratio must be decreasing from equation (19). Labor allocated to the Malthus sector eventually
decreases signiﬁcantly when the growth in labor supply slows down and causes an increase in the
capital-output ratio. Therefore, the growth rate in this two-sector model exhibit an inverted U-
shape pattern. The implied income diﬀerences mimic this pattern. As the barrier delays the turning
point for the distorted economy, the growth rate for the undistorted economy is higher than that
of the distorted economy before it starts to decrease. Thus, income diﬀerences increase during
this period. After this point, the model predicts faster growth in the distorted economy so that
t h ei n c o m ed i ﬀerence decreases. Income diﬀerences converge to a constant when both economies
converge to the Solow-only balanced growth path.
In this model income diﬀerences across countries are generated by diﬀerences in balanced growth
path levels and diﬀerences in turning points. It follows that the balanced growth income diﬀerences
are smaller than income diﬀerences along the transition from Malthus to Solow. Table (1) reports
the balanced growth income diﬀerences and the maximum income diﬀerences along the transition
between the undistorted economy and the distorted economy for varies value of π. It shows that as
π increases, the percentage diﬀerence between maximum income diﬀerence and the balanced growth
income diﬀerences increases. This is partly due to the longer delay of modern growth. For example,
when π is increased from 8 to 16, the delay in modern growth increases from 2 to 3 periods. Thus,
the percentage increase in the income diﬀerence rises from 33 percent to 40 percent.
To address the factor 30 income diﬀerences in the data, Table (2) reports the corresponding
combination of capita shares and barriers that can generate maximum diﬀerences of this magnitude.
Note that, to be consistent with my calibration procedure, γs and b have to be adjusted when θ
is increased. Note, therefore, that increasing θ need not necessarily increase the delay in modern
growth as noted earlier in section 4.1. Table (2) shows that by considering diﬀerent turning points,
the required size of barriers needed for a factor 30 income diﬀerence is much lower than the size
along the balanced growth path. For example, for θ equals to 0.4, π is reduced by 40 percent.
18The reduction holds true for other levels of θ as well. Note that a factor 30 income diﬀerence is
associated with a three- or four-period delay in the model. In other words, given the UK entered
into modern growth in 1800, the model predicts that a country 30 times poorer by today’s standard
is more likely to be the one that entered into modern growth in 1940.
Finally, I consider the exercise of increasing θ holding π ﬁxed. Given π equals to 4, Table (3)
illustrates that the percentage diﬀerence between maximum income diﬀerence and the balanced
growth diﬀerence is increasing in the value of capital’s shares. In particular, when θ equals 0.5,
the delay in modern growth increases the income diﬀerences by 45 percent. Thus, as θ increases,
the ability of the model to account for the current income disparity improves. It improves because
as θ increases the maximum income diﬀerences increases by more than the balanced growth path
diﬀerence.15
5P o p u l a t i o n P r o ﬁle
In the previous quantitative exercise I assumed the population proﬁle is the same for both distorted
and undistorted economies. My focus there was to study the eﬀect of barriers holding other factors
constant. I ﬁnd that the income diﬀerence between these two economies ﬁrst increases, reaching
a maximum equal to 3.2 (when π = 4), then decreases to its balanced growth path level of 2.5.
In the sensitivity analysis (Appendix 3), I ﬁnd that this result is sensitive to the change in the
population proﬁle. In particular, when the maximum population growth rate is increased from 2%
to 3% (m =2to m =2 .8) for both economies, the maximum income diﬀerence increases from 3.2
to 3.5, a nearly 10 percent increase. In view of this, it is of interest to see what the data imply for
the population proﬁles for a broader set of countries.
As shown in Figure (10), the data suggest that whereas the shapes of the population proﬁle are
15Alternatively, some have argued that some countries are poor because there are barriers that deter technology
adoption which in terms lower the level of total factor productivity. Thus, an alternative way to incorporate barriers






st . At a general level, these two types of models are isomorphic in that one
can choose the size of barriers such that they imply the same output per worker ratio along the balanced growth
path for the two models. In particular, set π2 = π
θ
1,where π1 and π2 are the barriers to capital accumulation and
technology adoption respectively. Then, the delay in turning points implied by these two models are the same and
same quantitative results apply.
19similar across countries, the peaks are very diﬀerent. More precisely, late developers have much
higher peaks than early developers.
Why does the population growth rate increase during the early development stage of an econ-
omy? One may think that this is solely due to the decline in the mortality rate. However, as Coale
(1979) has documented for the case of Europe, and Dyson and Murphy (1985) have documented
for the case of other countries, the total fertility rate was also increasing during this period. This
increase in the total fertility rate can be decomposed into changes in marriage behavior and changes
in marital fertility. Wrigley and Schoﬁeld (1981) provide evidence that in England, the marriage
rate increased and age of ﬁrst marriage decreased during the initial stage of industrialization. Ev-
idence from the demography literature ( see Dyson and Murphy (1985) ), suggests that marital
fertility was increasing during the early development stage and that this increase was mainly due
to changes in postpartum sexual abstinence and duration of breast-feeding. In addition, Livi-Bacci
(1997) shows that mortality levels at the early development stage in developing countries are more
or less the same as European mortality rates. However, the fertility rates in developing countries
are considerably larger than those experienced in European countries. Hence, the available litera-
ture suggests that the diﬀerence in the peaks of population proﬁles in Figure (10) is due mainly to
diﬀerential fertility rates. Cultural, religious and policy diﬀerences that aﬀect the fertility decision
may all be important for understanding Figure (10). While understanding what accounts for these
diﬀerences is of interest in its own right, I will simply take these diﬀerences as exogenous and
examine their consequences for development.
Given the diﬀerence in population proﬁles, I now ask what is the implication of the model if I
allow the distorted economy to also have a population proﬁle with a bigger m. Speciﬁcally, I assume
the maximum growth rate for the distorted economy (π =4 )is 3 percent, compared to 2 percent
of the undistorted economy. As discussed earlier, this change in the maximum growth rate will not
aﬀect the turning point.
The eﬀect on relative income is shown in Figure (11). The lower line in Figure (11) is the
same as Figure (8) which plots the relative income paths for two economies that are identical in
20every aspect except for the level of their barriers. The upper line in Figure (11) corresponds to
the case in which the maximum population growth rate in the distorted economy is higher than
in the undistorted economy. The maximum income diﬀerence increases from 3.2 to 4, which is a
25 percent increase. Moreover, the income diﬀerences from 1940 to 2045 increase by more than
20 percent. Therefore, the model conﬁrms the intuition that the diﬀerence in population proﬁles
between the early and the later developers is important in accounting for their income diﬀerences.
6 Applications
In this section, I consider two case studies to illustrate the strength of this model. These two cases
are Japan and Africa. In particular, they demonstrate two interesting and important development
facts: (1) the current disparities in income observed across countries is high and (2) the countries
that have undergone a growth miracle are those countries that are initially among the bottom of
the world. In the case study of Africa, I show that a size of barriers that accounts for the delay in
the turning point can also account for the subsequent behavior of Africa’s relative income. In the
case study of Japan, I ﬁnd that the model can generate both the miracle and subsequent slowdown
in the growth of income.
6.1 Application I: Africa
The long run data presented in Lucas (1998) shows that the UK’s income was only two times higher
than Africa’s in 1750. This factor increased to 14 in 1990. Moreover, the data also indicate that
the turning point for Africa was around 1900 as suggested by Reynolds (1985). In this section, I
address the following question: can barriers that account for the diﬀerence in the turning points
between two economies also account for the subsequent path of their income disparities?
We learn from Figure (8) that this model can generate the pattern of increasing income diﬀerence






(18) using the turning points of the UK and Africa.
Assume that the values of all parameters except π are the same for the UK and the Africa.
21Speciﬁcally, θ =0 .5 and γs =1 .43. This value of θ is larger than that in section 4.2. This is in
accordance with many authors, e.g. Parente and Prescott, who have argued that capital’s share
should be higher than the canonical values because of unmeasured investment.16 Given these values,
π must be between 5 and 9 to generate a three-period delay. In what follows I assume that π =8
for Africa. This is a plausible value as shown in Restuccia and Urrutia (2001).
With this size of barriers, the model predicts that the UK’s income relative to Africa will reach
a maximum of 12 in 2045 and then decrease to its balanced growth path level of 8.17 Figure (12)
shows that the model replicates the increasing trend of the income diﬀerence between the UK and
Africa and accounts for around 70 percent of the income diﬀerence in 1970 and 1980. By matching
the turning points, I have shown that the subsequent paths generated by the model are quite close
to the data.
The above calculation assumed no diﬀerences between the UK and Africa other than the size of
barriers. In what follows I analyze how incorporating other sources of heterogeneity may improve
on the model’s predictions. The ﬁrst element I consider is initial conditions. As mentioned earlier,
even before the turning point of the UK, output per capita in the UK was almost double it’s
corresponding value in Africa. I assume all parameters as before but diﬀerent land per worker in
period 0. The ratio of their outputs per capita along the Malthus balanced growth path is equal to
( lUK
lAfrica)(1−µ−φ)/(1−φ) where l denotes land per worker in period 0. I then choose the relative value
of land per worker in the two economies to match the initial income diﬀerence.18 Figure (13) shows
the model’s prediction for this scenario. With this adjustment in initial conditions, the model now
accounts for around 90 percent of the income diﬀerence in 1970 and 1980. However, the model did
not perform well for the income diﬀerence in 1990.
The second source of heterogeneity that I consider is diﬀerences in population proﬁles. As
discussed earlier, the population proﬁles for Africa and the UK are quite diﬀerent. Speciﬁcally,
Africa had a maximum population growth rate of 4% whereas the UK had a maximum level of
16The choice of θ will mainly aﬀect the level of π but not the main results.
17I use linear interpolation between the periods in the model to compare the model with the data.
18Of course it is not literally land per person that matters, but rather eﬃciency units of land per person from the
perspective of the technology.
221.5%. In order to assess the impact of these diﬀerences, I set m =4f o rA f r i c aa c c o r d i n gt ot h e
calibration for the population proﬁle described in section 4.2.1. As in section 5, I will simply take
these fertility diﬀerences as exogenous.
Figure (14) shows that the model implies a much higher income diﬀerence for the period 1960-
1990. Moreover, the model predicts that if the relative size of barriers in Africa remains unchanged,
the UK’s income relative to Africa will increase to 24 in 2045 before decreasing towards its balanced
growth path level. Moreover, note that the model now replicates closely the income diﬀerence in
1990.
To sum up, the case of Africa illustrates some interesting predictions of the model. First, the
size of barriers that accounts for the delay in the turning point for Africa relative to the UK can
account for 70 percent of the current income diﬀerence. Second, in contrast with the standard
balanced growth path approach, the model predicts that income disparities between Africa and the
UK will continue to worsen even if relative barriers are unchanged. Last but not the least, the high
peaked population proﬁle in Africa implies the current income diﬀerence will double in ﬁfty years.
6.2 Application II: Japan
Japan is an interesting case study because it underwent a development miracle experience. Modern
growth began in Japan around the end of 19th century, 100 years later than the UK. However,
Japan’s GDP per capita exceeded that of the UK in 1990, only 90 years after its period of modern
growth began. This rapid rate of catch up can be seen in Figure (15). Its GDP per capita growth
rate was 7.5% in 1950-60 and 9.5% in 1960-70, compared to a 2.5% for the UK in 1950-70. However,
the growth rate in Japan dropped to 3.5% in 1970-90.
Within a version of the neoclassical growth model, Parente and Prescott (1994) interpret the
miracle in Japan as a reduction in its size of barriers to less than that of the US, while the subsequent
slowdown is associated with an increase in its relative size. They argue that Japan is converging to
three diﬀerent balanced growth paths corresponding to the period before the miracle, during the
miracle, and the slowdown after the miracle.
23Instead of studying this postwar development as an isolated experience, I look at it as a part of
the long run economic development of Japan. I ﬁnd that the slowdown of the Japanese economy
after its miracle can be obtained without increasing its relative size of barriers. The diﬀerence in our
results highlight the diﬀerence in my approach and the standard balanced growth path approach
in accounting for international income diﬀerences.
As Japan also experienced a three-period delay compared to the UK, I assume π equal to 8 in
Japan along the Malthus-only balanced growth path. The historical record suggests two episodes
that signiﬁcantly lowered barriers in Japan. They are the Meiji Restoration in 1868 which ended
Shogunate Japan, and the postwar economic and institutional reforms.
According to Yamamura (1977), the new Meiji government adopted policies to encourage the
absorption and dissemination of western technologies and skills, and help the growth of private
industries. Following these policy changes, the fraction of workers employed in industry by both
private and public ﬁrms increased signiﬁcantly in 1907.
Postwar Japan underwent many major reforms such as introducing numerous tax-exemptions or
tax-reliefs for investment; industry-ﬁnancing program; allowing the purchase of new foreign patents;
dissolving the zaibatsu system19 and the deconcentration of many zaibatsu subsidiaries; and trade
liberalization.20 According to Ohkawa and Rosovsky (1963), these reforms led to a steep rise in
the rate of private investment, a rapid decline in the agricultural sector, an acceleration of the
introduction of new technologies, and a 38% increase in the productivity level of the manufacturing
sector.
These reductions in barriers are also consistent with the data reported in Collins and Williamson
(1999) and Jones (1994). Based on the data in their Tables (1a) — (2b), Figure (16) plots the data
for Japan only while Figure (17) plots the data for Japan relative to the UK. Figure (16) illustrates
two consistent facts for Japan during the period 1750 — 1950. First, the price of capital goods
19The ”zaibatsu” is referred to a relatively small number of family-dominated company systems holding assets
through large segments of the Japanese economy. These groups had become a major force in Japanese economic and
political life before the World War II.
20There are many references for these reforms. For examples, Tsuru (1961), Ohkawa and Rosovsky (1963) and
Rotwein (1964).
24relative to consumer goods decreased drastically between 1875/79 to 1880/84 and remained fairly
stable thereafter. Second, the price of equipment relative to consumer goods fell by 63 percent
between 1875/79 and 1880/84 and continued to fall steadily during the period 1880 — 1950. Figure
(17) plots the ratio of these relative prices between Japan and UK. The ratio of the relative price of
capital goods in Japan to the UK dropped drastically between 1875/79 and 1880/84 and remained
fairly stable until 1945. Similarly, the relative price of equipment in Japan to the UK dropped by
32 percent between 1875/79 and 1880/84, then fell steadily to a ratio of 2 in 1910, and remained
fairly stable until 1945. This evidence is consistent with the view that barriers in Japan were
reduced after the Meiji Restoration. According to Collins and Williamson, the relative price of
equipment in Japan was 1.9 times that of the US in 1950. For the period 1960-1985, ﬁgures in
Jones (1994) demonstrate that the relative price of equipment in Japan relative to the UK is equal
to 0.6. Therefore, the data also supports a further reduction in π f o rt h ep o s t w a rp e r i o d .
In view of these facts, I carry out the following exercise to account for the experience of Japan.
Initially, π equal 8. In 1905, π is reduced by half. This I do because Figure (17) shows the ratio
of relative equipment price between UK and Japan is reduced by half from 1870 to 1905. While
I am not limiting my interpretation of barriers to this one dimension, I think this magnitude of
reduction is at least a useful benchmark. Finally, based on the evidence in Jones (1994), I assume
π is reduced to 0.6 for the postwar period. When solving for the model’s equilibrium, I assume
these changes in π are unexpected to the household.
Figure (18) shows the model’s predictions. As seen, the model predicts that Japan catches up
with the UK. There are two interesting points to note. First, the income diﬀerence for the period
1875 to 1940 is fairly stable though π is reduced by half in 1905. This is because the model predicts
an inverted U-shape (see Figure (17)) for the time path of income diﬀerences for a given level of π.
Therefore, if π is reduced before the maximum income diﬀerence is reached, it will only cause the
income diﬀerence to increase at a smaller rate but not necessarily reduce it. This is an interesting
property of the model and is consistent with the ﬁnding of Restuccia and Urrutia (2001) that the
range of the relative price of investment is decreasing for the period 1960-85 while the magnitude
25of income diﬀerences is not.
Second, as shown in Figure (19), the model replicates both the Japanese miracle and the
slowdown.21 In contrast to Parente and Prescott (1994), in my model both the slowdown and
miracle are consistent with a single change in π at the end of WWII. This result is closely related
to the hump-shaped growth dynamics generated by this model.
I close this section with a remark. Reynolds (1985) documents that turning points for many
countries have been associated with major political reform. In the context of this model, political
reform (a permanent reduction in the level of barriers) is not necessary to generate a turning point,
as shown in proposition 1. However, it can speed up the process of shifting input from the Malthus
sector to the Solow sector. Moreover, as in the standard barrier model, it moves the economy to a
higher balanced growth path. As shown by Japan’s example, political reform increases the growth
rate signiﬁcantly.
7C o n c l u s i o n
Recent studies have emphasized diﬀerences in the cost of capital accumulation as a determinant of
cross-country income diﬀerences, but they have generally focused on steady states. In this paper
I focus on the role of the cost of capital accumulation in determining the beginning date and pace
of modern economic growth. A fundamental property of the model is that cross-country income
diﬀerences exhibit an inverted U-shape pattern over time, an important feature of long run economic
data. A key implication of my model is that a substantial fraction of existing income diﬀerences
is really a transitional phenomenon. This transitional eﬀect increases signiﬁcantly when I include
the fact that today’s low-income countries have had higher population growth rates during the
early development stage than did the currently rich countries. I ﬁnd interesting results in two case
studies. The case of Africa relative to the UK demonstrates that the size of barriers that accounts
for the diﬀerences in turning points also accounts for the path of relative income. The case of Japan
21The removal of barriers can only partly replicate the postwar miracle of Japan as the destruction of the capital
during the war is also an important factor.
26relative to the UK illustrates how the model can generate both the growth miracle and slowdown
along the same development path.
There still remain other interesting questions. We have seen from Figure (10) that population
proﬁles are diﬀerent between early and late developers. While the population proﬁles of these coun-
tries do not aﬀect their turning points, they have signiﬁcant eﬀects on the path of relative income.
In this paper, I have treated the diﬀerences in population proﬁles across countries as exogenous.
Endogenizing these diﬀerences is certainly an interesting topics. Doepke (1999) endogenizes the
fertility dynamics for the Hansen-Prescott model I consider here. By assuming countries have the
same population growth rate at their common turning point, the diﬀerences in the peaks of the
population growth rates cannot be addressed in his model. Thus, we are still in search for a theory
to accounts for such diﬀerences.
This model abstracts from the fact that home production (non-market sector) plays an im-
portant role in the early development stage of economy. Parente, Rogerson and Wright (2000)
extend the standard barrier model to include home production. They ﬁnd that the measured
income disparity along the balanced growth path increases signiﬁcantly if market and home pro-
duced goods are close substitutes and the capital share of the home production technology is small.
Incorporating home production in this model is expected to work in a similar way as in their model.
Another interesting extension is to allow for mortality risk and human capital accumulation.
One well-known development fact is that average years of schooling and life expectancy both in-
crease over time. Moreover, the data clearly suggest a positive relationship between life expectancy
at birth and GDP per capita for a given country. Intuitively, these features may be important
because higher mortality may dampen the incentives for both human capital and physical capital
accumulation, thereby slowing down the transition studied here. Incorporating these features into
my model, modern growth begins later in a country with higher cost of capital accumulation, and
so does its improvement in life expectancy. This provides a simple reason for why child labor is
more prevalent in low-income countries, since acquiring education becomes less attractive relative
to working if the return to education is decreased by a short life. Thus the model predicts both low
27levels of schooling and high mortality risk in low-income countries, a prediction which is supported
by McGrattan and Schmitz (1998). They ﬁnd a strong correlation between GDP per worker and
the capital to output ratio, GDP per worker and primary school enrollment, and GDP per worker
and secondary school enrollment in 1985.
28Appendix 1.
Given qt−1,N t,L,a n dIt ≡ Nt−1(wt−1−c1t−1)−qt−1L, the total value of capital goods available
at time t,and the fact that Solow technology is used, the fraction of labor and capital input allocated
to each sectors can be determined. Proﬁt and utility maximization conditions imply
kmt= ψπkst
where kmt = Kmt
Nmt,k st = Kst
Nst,ψ=
(1−θ)φ
θµ < 1. Use the market clearing conditions
kmt =
ψIt/Nt
1 − (1 − ψ)mt
where mt = Nmt






























Note that f is strictly decreasing in mt if positive land share in the Malthus technology(1-
µ−φ>0) and capital is more important for the Solow technology(θ ≥ φ). Together with f (0) > 0
and f (1) < 0 (since t ≥ t∗






is increasing in t,t h e nmt converges to zero. This condition holds if γs ≥ γm and either (i)1−θ ≥ µ
and g (c1t) ≥ 1 or (ii) 1-θ<µand exist ¯ t and suﬃciently small n ≥ 1 s.t. g (c1t) ≤ n ∀t>¯ t.
Appendix 2.





. As shown previ-
ously, young consume 1
1+β fraction of wage income. Since price of land converges to zero, feasibility
implies
Kt+1 = Nt (wt − c1t)=Nt
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Appendix 3. Sensitivity Analysis
I examine the robustness of the shape of Figure (8) with respect to changes in parameters of
the model. These parameters are initial population, initial capital stock, quality of land, initial
TFP levels for the Malthus and Solow technologies, input shares for Malthus technology, population
growth rate along the Malthus balanced growth path, and the population growth function g(c1).
Initial Conditions Figures (20) and (21) demonstrate that doubling initial population, initial
capital, quality of land and Am
As all have insigniﬁcant eﬀects on the shape of the income diﬀerence
curve.
Input Shares of the Malthus Technology Conditioning on the fact that the input shares
does not aﬀect the turning points, changing both the capital and land shares of the Malthus
technology have an insigniﬁcant eﬀect on the income diﬀerence. This is not surprising given Figure
(5); the economy is almost in a Solow-only economy three periods after modern growth begins.
Therefore input shares of the Malthus technology are not important in determining the income
diﬀerence along the transition path.
Population Growth Rate Along the Malthus Balanced Growth Path Doubling the
population growth rate along the Malthus balanced growth path from 0.3 percent to 0.6 percent
will increase γm from 1.03 to 1.07. This will not have an eﬀect on the turning point according to
the equation (11). Moreover, γm does not enter into g(c1) when consumption is more than double
its Malthus steady level. And, Figure (7) illustrates that consumption is doubled two periods after
the transition. Therefore, γm is insigniﬁcant in determining the income diﬀerence once modern
growth begins.
30Population Dynamics I check the robustness of shape of income diﬀerence by varying x1,x 2
and m. Figures (22) and (23) show that both x1 and x2 have an insigniﬁcant eﬀect on the maximum
income diﬀerence but m has a signiﬁcant eﬀect. By increasing the maximum annual population
growth rate from 2% to 3% (m =2to m =2 .81), the maximum income diﬀerence is increased from
3.2 to 3.5 (a nearly 10 percent increase).
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34Table 1: Relative output per worker with θ equal to 0.4
π Delay BGP Diﬀerence Maximum Diﬀerence Percent Increased
2 1 1.6 1.8 18%
4 2 2.5 3.2 26%
8 2 4 5.3 33%
16 3 6.3 8.8 40%
32 4 10 14.1 41%
64 4 16 23 44%
Table 2: Combinations of θ and π f o rf a c t o r3 0i n c o m ed i ﬀerences
θ Delay π (B G P) π ( Transition ) Percent Reduced
0.33 4 900 500 44%
0.4 4 164 100 39%
0.45 4 64 40 37%
0.5 4 30 18 40%
0.55 3 16 10 38%
0.6 3 10 6.5 35%
Table 3: Relative output per worker with π equals to 4
θ Delay BGP Level Maximum Level Percent Increased
0.33 1 2.0 2.3 15%
0.4 2 2.5 3.2 26%
0.45 2 3.1 4.1 31%
0.5 2 4 5.8 45%
0.55 2 5.4 8.1 50%
0.6 2 8 13 63%




































































































Figure 4: Population Growth Function
1
1x 1 x 2
C1/C1m
m







1765 1800 1835 1870 1905 1940 1975
UK
Barrier = 4







1765 1800 1835 1870 1905 1940 1975
UK
Barrier = 4






1765 1800 1835 1870 1905 1940 1975
UK
Barrier = 4






1765 1800 1835 1870 1905 1940 1975 2010 2045 2080 2115





1765 1800 1835 1870 1905 1940 1975 2010 2045 2080 2115
UK
Barrier = 4
























1765 1800 1835 1870 1905 1940 1975 2010 2045 2080 2115









1750 1800 1850 1875 1900 1925 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2010 2045 2080 2115 2150 2185
Data Model









1750 1800 1850 1875 1900 1925 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2010 2045 2080 2115 2150 2185
Data Model










1750 1800 1850 1875 1900 1925 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2010 2045 2080 2115 2150 2185
Data Model 







1800 1850 1875 1900 1925 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990
%
UK Japan

































1875 1885 1895 1905 1915 1925 1935 1945
Relative capital good prices
Relative price of equipment






1750 1800 1850 1875 1900 1925 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2010 2045 2080 2115 2150 2185
Data Model







1765 1800 1835 1870 1905 1940 1975 2010 2045 2080 2115 2150 2185
UK Japan




































1765 1800 1835 1870 1905 1940 1975 2010 2045 2080 2115
baseline
m=2. 81
43CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
Recent Discussion Papers 
 
               
560  M. J. Conyon 
R. B. Freeman 
Shared Modes of Compensation and Firm 
Performance:  UK Evidence 
     
559  R. B. Freeman 
R. Schettkat 
Marketization of Production and the US-Europe 
Employment Gap 
     
558  R. B. Freeman  The Labour Market in the New Information Economy 
     
557  R. B. Freeman  Institutional Differences and Economic Performance 
Among OECD Countries 
     
556  M. GuttiJrrez-DomPnech  The Impact of the Labour Market on the Timing of 
Marriage and Births in Spain 
 
555  H. Gospel 
J. Foreman 
The Provision of Training in Britain:  Case Studies of 
Inter-Firm Coordination 
 
554  S. Machin  Factors of Convergence and Divergence in Union 
Membership 
 
553  J. Blanden 
S. Machin 
 
Cross-Generation Correlations of Union Status for 
Young People in Britain 
552  D. Devroye 
R. B. Freeman 
 
Does Inequality in Skills Explain Inequality of 
Earnings Across Advanced Countries? 
551  M. Guadalupe  The Hidden Costs of Fixed Term Contracts:  the 
Impact on Work Accidents 
 
550  G. Duranton  City Size Distribution as a Consequence of the 
Growth Process 
 
549  S. Redding 
A. J. Venables 
Explaining Cross-Country Export Performance:  
International Linkages and Internal Geography 
 
548  T. Bayoumi 
M. Haacker 
 
It’s Not What You Make, It’s How You Use IT:  
Measuring the Welfare Benefits of the IT Revolution 
Across Countries 
 
547  A. B. Bernard 
S. Redding 
P. K. Schott 
H. Simpson 
 
Factor Price Equalization in the UK? 546  M. GutiPrrez-DomJnech 
 
Employment Penalty After Motherhood in Spain 




Educational Attainment, Labour Market Institutions 
and the Structure of Production 




Where the Minimum Wage Bites Hard:  the 
Introduction of the UK National Minimum Wage to a 
Low Wage Sector 
543  R. Belfield 
D. Marsden 
Matchmaking:  the Influence of Monitoring 
Environments on the Effectiveness of Performance 
Pay Systems 
 
542  C. A. Pissarides  Consumption and Savings With Unemployment Risk:  
Implications for Optimal Employment Contracts 
 
541  M. Amiti 
C. A. Pissarides 
 
Trade and Industrial Location with Heterogeneous 
Labor 
540  G. Duranton 
H. G. Overman 
 
Testing for Localisation Using Micro-Geographic 
Data 
539  D. Metcalf  Unions and Productivity, Financial Performance and 
Investment:  International Evidence 
 




Spanish Unemployment Persistence and the Ladder 
Effect 
537  C. L. Mann 
E. E. Meade 
 
Home Bias, Transactions Costs, and Prospects for the 
Euro:  A More Detailed Analysis 
536  M. Manacorda 
E. Moretti 
 
Intergenerational Transfers and Household Structure.  
Why Do Most Italian Youths Live With Their 
Parents? 
535  D. Quah  One Third of the World’s Growth and Inequality 
 
534  D. Quah  Matching Demand and Supply in a Weightless 
Economy:  Market Driven Creativity With and 
Without IPRs 
 
533  R. Dickens 
A. Manning 
 




To order a discussion paper, please contact the Publications Unit 
Tel  020 7955 7673     Fax  020 7955 7595     Email  info@cep.lse.ac.uk 
Web site  http://cep.lse.ac.uk 